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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal of a district court order denying a 
motion for reconsideration filed by Hudson United Bank 
("Hudson"). The district court had dismissed Hudson's 
federal claims, and remanded the state claims to state 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). When Hudson 
moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and attempted to 
amend its complaint, the district court held that it had lost 
jurisdiction to hear the case when the remand order was 
sent to state court. Accordingly, Hudson's motion was 
denied. 
 
We hold that the district court had jurisdiction to 
entertain Hudson's motions. Thus, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
On March 20, 1995, Theodore H. Howard, Linda M. 
Howard, and their company, LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 
(collectively, "LiTenda") borrowed almost two million dollars 
from the Hudson United Bank ("Hudson") tofinance 
LiTenda's mortgage selling and servicing business. At the 
time, LiTenda was a mortgage seller/servicer approved by 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie 
Mac").1 As collateral for the loan, Hudson accepted 
LiTenda's contractual rights to income derived from 
servicing a portfolio of mortgages for Freddie Mac. 
 
On May 2, 1996, Freddie Mac terminated LiTenda's 
eligibility as a seller/servicer. In a letter faxed to LiTenda, 
Freddie Mac stated that LiTenda's eligibility was revoked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Freddie Mac is a federally chartered, sponsored, and regulated 
corporation that purchases home mortgages from lenders and sells 
securities to the public to fund the purchases. Mortgages are only 
purchased from, and serviced by, approved seller/servicers under the 
terms of contracts authored by Freddie Mac. See  12 U.S.C. S 1454 (1989 
& West Supp. 1997); American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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because LiTenda had violated their contractual agreement 
in at least nine different ways--among them, by pledging 
LiTenda's contractual rights as collateral to secure the loan 
with Hudson.2 The termination letter directed LiTenda to 
return all files and mortgage documents to Freddie Mac, 
who in turn transferred its portfolio to another servicer. 
 
Left without Freddie Mac's business, LiTenda's financial 
condition deteriorated, and the loan with Hudson went into 
default.3 When Hudson sought the contract rights it 
believed it was owed under the loan agreement with 
LiTenda, Freddie Mac rejected Hudson's claim. 
 
Hudson responded by filing a complaint in state court 
containing claims against both LiTenda and Freddie Mac.4 
Hudson's claims against Freddie Mac alleged that Freddie 
Mac was illegally withholding from Hudson the benefits it 
was due as collateral under the terms of its loan agreement 
with LiTenda. Freddie Mac then removed the case to federal 
court pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S 1452(f), which confers federal 
subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action to which 
Freddie Mac is a party. 
 
Once in federal court, Freddie Mac filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The contractual relationship between Freddie Mac and LiTenda was 
governed by a Seller/Servicer Guidebook authored by Freddie Mac. The 
Guidebook set out the rights and duties to which LiTenda was subject as 
a seller/servicer of Freddie Mac's mortgages. The nine violations of the 
Guidebook that Freddie Mac alleged included: failure to account properly 
for the disposition of funds; failure to fund and safeguard funds 
properly; failure to comply with financial responsibilities; and failure 
to 
maintain qualified facilities and staff. 
 
LiTenda subsequently petitioned Freddie Mac for review of the 
termination decision. On August 1, 1996, Freddie Mac affirmed its 
decision to terminate LiTenda's eligibility, calling LiTenda's violations 
of 
the contract "especially egregious," and stating that LiTenda's "record at 
Freddie Mac was marginal at best." 
 
3. LiTenda filed a petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New Jersey on November 21, 1996. 
 
4. Hudson also named several other parties as defendants. For the sake 
of clarity, however, we will focus our analysis here on the claims against 
LiTenda and Freddie Mac. 
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P. 12(b)(6). Freddie Mac argued that Hudson had failed to 
state a claim against Freddie Mac because Hudson's claim 
under the loan agreement derived solely from LiTenda's 
rights, and LiTenda's contract rights had been extinguished 
when Freddie Mac revoked LiTenda's privileges as a 
seller/servicer. Because LiTenda had no rights against 
Freddie Mac, Hudson could not use its claim to LiTenda's 
rights to state a cause of action against Freddie Mac. 
 
On November 26, 1996, the district court granted Freddie 
Mac's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
Agreeing with Freddie Mac that Hudson had no claim 
against Freddie Mac because LiTenda had no such claim, 
the district court dismissed all of the counts against 
Freddie Mac under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).5 Left without an 
original basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the 
district court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c), and remanded the remaining portions of the case 
against LiTenda. A certified copy of the remand order was 
mailed to the state court the next day, on November 27, 
1996. 
 
On December 6, 1996, Hudson filed several post- 
dismissal motions in the district court. First, Hudson 
moved for the district court to reconsider its dismissal 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
According to Hudson, the district court had wrongly 
concluded that LiTenda's rights were extinguished when 
Freddie Mac revoked LiTenda's status as a seller/servicer. 
Pointing to the contract between Freddie Mac and LiTenda, 
Hudson noted that this was true only if LiTenda's status 
had been revoked "with cause." If the termination was 
"without cause," Hudson continued, then the contract 
entitled LiTenda (and thus Hudson) to a termination fee 
equal to the market value of LiTenda's servicing portfolio. 
Although Hudson had not raised this issue previously, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Properly relying on Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. 
Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), the district court considered 
the portions of the Guidebook attached by the defendant and relied on 
by both parties. Those portions of the Guidebook made clear that 
LiTenda had no continuing rights in the servicing contract that Hudson 
could rely on, such that it was clear as a matter of law that Hudson was 
not entitled to relief. 
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Hudson now argued that the termination was "without 
cause." 
 
Hudson also moved to amend its complaint. The 
amended complaint contained what Hudson modestly 
termed "prophylactic" changes in its cause of action; in 
particular, the proposed amended complaint alleged for the 
first time that Freddie Mac had terminated LiTenda's 
portfolio "without cause."6 
 
The district court denied Hudson's motion in an order 
dated January 13, 1997. The district court quoted Trans 
Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 
1995) for the proposition that "a district court loses 
jurisdiction over a case once it has completed the remand 
by sending a certified copy of the remand order to the state 
court." Id. Because a certified copy of the remand order had 
been sent to the state court on November 27, 1996, the 
district court concluded that its jurisdiction to hear 
Hudson's motion for reconsideration had been divested on 
that date. The district court denied Hudson's motion 
without reaching the merits. 
 
Hudson filed a timely appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Although neither party contests our appellate 
jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to ensure that 
we have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before we 
attempt to resolve it. See PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 
349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the inquiry is 
complicated by the fact that there are three distinct orders 
that Hudson has attempted to appeal. 
 
The first is the November 26, 1996 order dismissing 
Hudson's claims against Freddie Mac under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), which we will refer to as "the dismissal order." The 
second is the November 26, 1996 order remanding the 
remaining claims against LiTenda to state court pursuant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Hudson also moved for a stay of the remand order. As the remand 
order had already been sent to state court, however, this motion was 
moot. 
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to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c), which we will refer to as "the 
remand order." The third is the January 13, 1997 order 
denying Hudson's motion for reconsideration, which we will 
refer to as "the reconsideration order." 
 
Our cases establish that we have appellate jurisdiction 
over the dismissal order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See 
Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 674-77 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding that a dismissal order preceding aS 1367(c) 
remand order is reviewable by direct appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291). The reasoning of Carr also makes clear that 
we have appellate jurisdiction over the reconsideration 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See id. 
 
Although we will resolve this case without reviewing the 
remand order, we note that we are authorized to exercise 
jurisdiction over the remand order as well. It is clear that 
28 U.S.C. S 1447(d) does not bar appellate review of the 
remand order, because it was issued not under S 1447(d), 
but rather pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania State Educ. 
Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
S 1447(d) is inapplicable to a remand order made pursuant 
to S 1367(c)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 947 (1997). Second, 
although we would be able to review the remand order only 
through a petition for mandamus, see PAS, 7 F.3d at 353, 
we may treat Hudson's notice of appeal as a mandamus 
petition. See Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 
F.3d 46, 51 (3d Cir. 1995).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Judge Greenberg is of the view that when, as here, a district court 
dismisses the federal claims from a case removed from state court and 
remands the state claims to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c)(3), instead of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them, 
that, upon reversal of the dismissal of the federal claims, the court of 
appeals may order that the state claims be reinstated without exercising 
mandamus jurisdiction. He believes that an appeal by the plaintiff in 
such a case is, in reality, from the dismissal order and not from the 
remand order, because the plaintiff may be content to litigate the state 
claims in state court where the plaintiff started the action. Therefore, 
the 
order from the court of appeals reinstating the state claims in federal 
court is merely incidental to the reversal of the dismissal and is 
authorized by 28 U.S.C. S 2106 which provides that after a reversal of a 
ruling by a district court, a court of appeals "may remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree or order, or require 
such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances." 
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III. 
 
The question posed by this case is whether the district 
court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Hudson's motion for 
reconsideration. Our answer is yes. 
 
A. 
 
Congress has designed our federal court system so that 
it affords civil litigants ample opportunity to seek review of 
adverse decisions in the inferior courts. First, litigants may 
request reconsideration of an unfavorable result in the 
district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b). Second, 
losing parties are entitled to seek review of "all final orders" 
in the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Third, 
litigants may request rehearing by a full court of appeals. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 35. The animating concept behind this 
forgiving structure is that justice is best served by the 
checks and balances afforded by regular opportunities for 
judicial review. 
 
Despite this general design, the need to deter vexatious 
litigation has led Congress to carve out exceptions in which 
review is curtailed or even eliminated. One such exception 
is the rule against review of remand orders following 
improper removal to federal court, currently codified at 28 
U.S.C. S 1447(c) and (d).8 This longstanding rule divests the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The text of 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) and (d) reads as follows: 
 
       (c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other 
       than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 
       days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 
1446(a). 
       If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district 
court 
       lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An 
       order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and 
       any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result 
of 
       the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be 
mailed 
       by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may 
       thereupon proceed with such case. 
       (d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
       removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an 
       order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 
       removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable 
by 
       appeal or otherwise. 
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federal courts of jurisdiction to review a district court's 
remand order when the order is based on a defect in 
removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
See Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 
336, 346, 96 S. Ct. 584, 590 (1976); Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1718 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1447 (West Supp. 1997). 
 
Those attempting to divine the meaning of S 1447 from its text would 
do well to recall that sometimes "a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S. Ct. 506, 
507 (1921) (Holmes, J.). In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 
423 U.S. 336, 96 S. Ct. 584 (1976), the Supreme Court examined the 
century-old history of Congress's bar to review of remand orders and 
concluded that the bar to review contained in S 1447(d) covered only 
remands issued because a case was removed improperly or the district 
court was without subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 346-50; 96 S. 
Ct. at 590-93. At the time of Thermtron, the text of S 1447(c) provided 
the 
textual hook for this interpretation. It then read:"If at any time before 
final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and 
without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may 
order the payment of just costs." Thermtron , 423 U.S. at 342, 96 S. Ct. 
at 589. Thus, the Court concluded that the bar to review contained in 
S 1447(d) applied only when the remand was based on the grounds 
specified in S 1447(c). See id. at 346; 96 S. Ct. at 590. 
 
Congress has since amended S 1447(c) several times, most recently in 
1996. The amendments have focused on creating and clarifying time 
limits concerning when a plaintiff can seek a remand following removal 
from state court. These amendments have slightly altered the grounds 
for remand "specified" in the text of S 1447(c): the statute now speaks of 
remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remands for "any 
defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. S 
1447(c) 
(West Supp. 1997). Rather than take this change in language as a 
wholesale rejection of Thermtron and a dramatic expansion of S 1447(d), 
we will assume that Congress did not mean to upset the Thermtron limits 
on S 1447(d), and that they remain in effect unchanged by the 
intervening textual modifications to S 1447(c). This conclusion is 
supported by the legislative history of the 1996 amendment. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-799 at 2-3 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3417, 
3418-19 (suggesting that the textual changes were designed only to 
clarify Congressional intent on the timing of remands made for reasons 
other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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(1996). The purpose of the rule is to prevent a party to a 
state lawsuit from using federal removal provisions and 
appeals as tool to introduce substantial delay into a state 
action. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 354-55, 96 S. Ct. at 
594-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Without S 1447(d), a 
party to a state action could remove the action to federal 
court, await remand, request reconsideration of the 
remand, appeal, request rehearing, and then file a petition 
for a writ of certiorari, all before being forced to return to 
state court several years later. See Greenwood v. Peacock, 
384 U.S. 808, 832-33, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (1966) 
(contemplating the delay that would result if state criminal 
defendants could regularly seek removal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1443, and then seek review of subsequent remand 
orders). To avoid this delay, Congress has fashioned an 
exception to the general rule of review, and made a district 
court's initial determination that removal was 
inappropriate, a nonreviewable one. 
 
B. 
 
In the present case, the district court issued a remand 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c),9  rather than 28 U.S.C. 
S 1447(c). Section 1367(c) grants district courts the 
discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
when "values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, 
and comity" counsel that the district court remand state 
claims to a state forum. See City of Chicago v. International 
College of Surgeons, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 118 S. Ct. 523, 534 
(1997) (quoting Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 
343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619 (1988)). Because the original 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c) (1993) states: 
 
       (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
       jurisdiction over a claim under [28 U.S.C. S 1367](a) if-- 
 
       (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 
       (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims 
       over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
       (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
       original jurisdiction, or 
       (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling 
       reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
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basis of federal jurisdiction in this case was the presence of 
Freddie Mac as a party, see 12 U.S.C. S 1452(f), the district 
court exercised its discretion and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against 
LiTenda following the dismissal of the claims against 
Freddie Mac. See 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3). 
 
The first question posed by this case is whether the bar 
to review provided by S 1447(d) is even implicated when a 
district court enters a remand order pursuant toS 1367(c). 
The decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, and our 
sister circuits make clear that S 1367(c) remands, such as 
the one entered by the district court here, do not invoke the 
bar to review prescribed by S 1447(d). See, e.g., Cohill, 484 
U.S. at 355 n.11, 108 S. Ct. at 621 n.11 ("Section[ ] 1447(c) 
. . . do[es] not apply to cases over which a federal court has 
pendent jurisdiction. Thus, the remand authority conferred 
by the removal statute and the remand authority conferred 
by the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at all."); 
Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n v. Pennsylvania State Educ. 
Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
S 1447(d) is inapplicable to a remand order made pursuant 
to S 1367(c)); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 
217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 
F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). See also Things 
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 130, 116 S. Ct. 
494, 498 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that 
several other circuits have agreed that remands pursuant 
to S 1367(c) do not implicate the bar to review provided by 
S 1447(d)) (citing cases); Trans Penn, 50 F.3d at 224 (same) 
(citing cases from eight circuits). 
 
Although the sharp distinction between remands 
authorized by S 1367(c) and remands authorized by 
S 1447(c) is often misunderstood, the reason behind their 
different treatment is clear. Review of S 1447(c) remands is 
barred to keep parties to state actions from making 
dubious allegations of federal jurisdiction in order to 
forestall the prompt resolution of state cases. Thus, 
S 1447(c) remands are warranted only when a federal court 
has no rightful authority to adjudicate a state case that has 
been removed from state court. In such cases, the statute 
provides a quick, permanent, and mandatory remedy to 
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return a state case to state court. See International Primate 
Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 
500 U.S. 72, 89, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 1710 (1991). 
 
By contrast, S 1367(c) serves no such corrective purpose. 
Remands authorized by S 1367(c) may be entered only when 
federal subject matter jurisdiction has been affirmatively 
established, via 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a), and are entered 
independently of whether the case originated in state or 
federal court. See International College of Surgeons, 118 S. 
Ct. at 530. Thus, a district court's decision to remand 
pursuant to S 1367(c) does not imply that the case was 
improperly filed in federal court. Rather, it reflects the 
court's judgment, reviewable on appeal for abuse of 
discretion, see Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 
1981), that at the present stage of litigation it would be best 
for supplemental jurisdiction to be declined so that state 
issues may be adjudicated by a state court. See United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 
1139-40 (1966). In such circumstances, there is no 
pressing need to block the mechanisms of review that are 
generally afforded civil litigants. 
 
Thus, the bar to review codified at S 1447(d) is entirely 
inapplicable when the basis of the remand was the district 
court's discretion pursuant to S 1367(c). 
 
C. 
 
Freddie Mac contends that we should construe the cases 
holding that the S 1447 bar to review is inapplicable when 
a remand is issued under S 1367(c) as establishing that 
only appellate jurisdiction is available. Conceding our 
appellate jurisdiction, Freddie Mac argues that the bar to 
review should nonetheless apply to post-remand motions 
filed before the district court. In other words, Freddie Mac 
argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the post-remand motions, but that we have 
appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the district 
court's orders. 
 
We cannot agree. It is difficult to understand how we can 
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the merits of a case if 
the district court in which the notice of appeal wasfiled did 
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not itself have jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was 
filed. Federal jurisdiction cannot be "lost" by the district 
court one day and then "found" by the court of appeals 
later on. Rather, jurisdiction that is originally and properly 
vested in the district court becomes vested in the court of 
appeals when a notice of appeal is filed. See Venen v. 
Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1985) ("As a general rule, 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal is an event of 
jurisdictional significance, immediately conferring 
jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals and divesting a district 
court of its control over those aspects of the case involved 
in the appeal.") Thus, if S 1447(d) does not deny an 
appellate court jurisdiction to review a remand order, it 
cannot deny the district court jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion for reconsideration before the notice of appeal is 
filed. See, e.g., J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 
909 F.2d 267, 273-274 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
district court has the power to reconsider its order following 
a S 1367(c) remand during the time allowed forfiling a 
notice of appeal). 
 
D. 
 
We next address whether the mailing of the S 1367(c) 
remand order to state court divested the district court of 
jurisdiction. The primary support for this view derives from 
language in Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 
217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995), which could be read (and was 
read, by the district court) to suggest that the answer to 
that question is "yes." However, such a reading of the dicta 
in Trans Penn would ignore the sharp distinction between 
S 1447(c) remands and those remands authorized by 
S 1367(c). Accordingly, we conclude that the mailing of a 
remand order does not divest a district court of jurisdiction 
to entertain a motion for reconsideration following a 
remand order issued under S 1367(c). 
 
Trans Penn was a labor action brought by employees in 
state court against their employer. Following the employer's 
removal to federal court, the employees withdrew their 
federal claims and asked the district court to remand the 
remaining state claims to state court. The district court did 
so, exercising its discretion according to S 1367(c). 
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Subsequently, the employer filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was denied on the merits. The 
employer then petitioned our court for a writ of mandamus, 
arguing that the remand was inappropriate because federal 
issues remained lurking within the remaining state claims. 
 
Before reaching the merits, we addressed at length 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to reconsider its 
remand order on the merits. We began by noting correctly 
that the S 1447(d) bar to review was inapplicable because 
the remand order was issued pursuant to S 1367(c). See id. 
at 224. Nonetheless, the court suggested, there was a 
question as to whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
reconsider its own remand order. Our own precedent, the 
court intimated, was "inconclusive." Id.  at 226. First, there 
was a "general rule . . . that a district court loses 
jurisdiction over a case once it has completed the remand 
by sending a certified copy of the remand order to the state 
court." Id. at 225. Second, remands authorized by S 1367(c) 
were generally reviewable. Finding no evidence that a 
remand order had been sent to the state court, and noting 
that the S 1367(c) remand did not implicateS 1447(d), we 
held that the district court retained jurisdiction to 
reconsider its order of remand. See id. at 227. 
 
The conclusion we have reached in this case is in accord 
with the holding of Trans Penn. In both cases, the district 
court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its remand order. 
To the extent that dicta in Trans Penn could be read as 
suggesting a different result would be warranted if the 
remand order had been sent to state court before the 
motion for reconsideration was filed, we disavow that 
notion. Indeed, the law in our circuit is clear. The mailing 
of a remand order divests the district court of jurisdiction 
when the remand is authorized by S 1447(c).  See Hunt v. 
Acromed Corp., 961 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1992). When 
the remand is authorized by S 1367(c), the bar to review is 
inapplicable and the district court may reconsider its 
remand order just as it would any other order. See Trans 
Penn, 50 F.3d at 227; Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 
616 (5th Cir. 1994); Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 
909 F.2d at 273-274. 
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Because the remand in this case was authorized by 
S 1367(c), the mailing of the remand order to state court did 
not divest the district court of jurisdiction to entertain 
Hudson's motion for reconsideration. 
 
IV. 
 
Having determined that the district court retained 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Hudson's motion for 
reconsideration, we must next decide whether to proceed to 
the merits of the case or reverse and remand to the district 
court. Hudson argues that we should reverse the 
reconsideration order of the district court, and remand this 
case to the district court so it may entertain Hudson's 
motion on the merits. Freddie Mac contends that in the 
name of judicial economy we should address the merits of 
the motion for reconsideration in this appeal. 
 
When a district court has failed to reach a question below 
that becomes critical when reviewed on appeal, an appellate 
court may sometimes resolve the issue on appeal rather 
than remand to the district court. See, e.g., Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust 
Co., 93 F.3d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996) (summary 
judgment). This procedure is generally appropriate when 
the factual record is developed and the issues provide 
purely legal questions, upon which an appellate court 
exercises plenary review. In such a case, an appellate 
tribunal can act just as a trial court would, so nothing is 
lost by having the reviewing court address the disputed 
issue in the first instance. See Otto v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1138 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 
Such a procedure may be inappropriate, however, when 
the issue to be addressed is not a purely legal question. 
When the resolution of an issue requires the exercise of 
discretion or fact finding, for example, it is inappropriate 
and unwise for an appellate court to step in. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, "the proper role of the court of 
appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts 
but to make sure that the conclusions derived from those 
weighings and assessments are juridically sound and 
supported by the record." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General 
Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1466 (1980). 
 
                                15 
  
The merits of Hudson's motion for reconsideration and to 
amend its pleadings fall within the zone of discretion and 
judgment that is best addressed initially by the district 
court. A district court's decision to deny a motion for 
reconsideration is placed within the sound discretion of the 
district court; factual determinations supporting its 
decision are reviewed by us under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance 
Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995). Similarly, a district 
court's decision to grant or deny leave to amend pleadings 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Heyl & Patterson 
Int'l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing, 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 
1981). It is not our place to exercise the discretion normally 
afforded the district court. 
 
Accordingly, we will not reach the merits of Hudson's 
motion, and instead will remand to the district court so 
that the district court can take whatever steps are 
necessary to entertain Hudson's post-dismissal motions. If 
Hudson's reconsideration motion is granted, and if it is 
permitted to amend its complaint, the district court will 
need to vacate the remand order and give appropriate 
notification to the state court. If Hudson's motions are 
denied, however, no such steps will be necessary: it would 
be a waste of judicial effort (indeed, a needless spinning of 
wheels) to reclaim the state action from state court, only to 
have to order a remand again immediately thereafter. Of 
course, we do not express any opinion as to the merits of 
Hudson's motions, leaving it to the sound discretion of the 
district court as to how it regards allegations in Hudson's 
original and amended complaint, as well as the timeliness 
of Hudson's "without cause" theory. 
 
The January 13, 1997 order of the district court will be 
reversed, and remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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